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Security

SECURITY EDUCATION AND TRAINING



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This Instruction implements AFD 31-1, *Physical Security*, AFI 31-101, *The Air Force Physical Security Program*, MACDI 31-103, *The Physical Security Program*, and AMC Pamphlet 31-3, *The Installation Security Constable Handbook*. It establishes procedures for developing and organizing Phase I training standards. It establishes and describes the restricted areas located within the boundaries of MacDill Air Force Base (AFB) and further describes procedures for granting authorized entry into such areas. It applies to all personnel requiring access to MacDill AFB restricted areas.

1. Requirements.

1.1. Personnel requiring unescorted entry into a restricted area will be provided Phase I Security Education by the assigned security manager. The Phase I training must include a review of the 6th Air Mobility Wing (6 AMW) Installation Security Plan 31-101; methods for contacting the Security Forces Control Center (SFCC); restricted area entry circulation control procedures, including verification of the right and need to be in a restricted area; responsibilities and duties of a visitor escort; and tricks that may be used to gain unauthorized entry to restricted areas.

2. Security Education And Training (SET) Program.

2.1. Phase I, Orientation Training, as listed in AFI 31-101, paragraph 7.2.2., will be accomplished during indoctrination training by the unit security managers.

2.2. Phase II, Continuation Training, as listed in AFI 31-101, paragraph 7.2.3., will be accomplished by the individual units and the Installation Security Constable.

2.2.1. Individual units will be responsible for conducting training on the following items as a minimum:

2.2.1.1. Information on threats to USAF protection level resources.

2.2.1.2. Security procedures for restricted and controlled areas.

- 2.2.1.3. Duress words and authentication procedures.
- 2.2.1.4. Written knowledge tests (test results should be forwarded to the Installation Security Constable on an annual basis as determined by the CSF).
- 2.2.2. Installation Security Constable will conduct as a minimum:
 - 2.2.2.1. Visits to each restricted area work center twice per year.
 - 2.2.2.2. Detection exercises to determine the effectiveness of the training program.
- 2.3. Detection exercises will be tailored to meet the needs of the individual units. The Installation Security Council (ISC) has directed one exercise per quarter for units, other than 6th Security Forces (6 SFS), working flight line operations.
 - 2.3.1. Guidelines for Security Education Training (SET) exercises.
 - 2.3.1.1. The exercise must be coordinated with the SFCC and Maintenance Aircraft Coordination Center (MACC) to prevent confusion and/or interference with real world incidents.
 - 2.3.1.2. Give a detailed briefing on the exercise scenario.
 - 2.3.1.2.1. Give perpetrators exact actions you want them to take.
 - 2.3.1.2.2. Identify the work center or area where the exercise will be conducted.
 - 2.3.1.3. Discuss the specific objectives of the scenario.
 - 2.3.1.3.1. Give the perpetrator instructions on information gathering (names, unit, and actions taken or not taken by exercise participants).
 - 2.3.1.4. Discuss the time limit of the exercise.
 - 2.3.1.4.1. Specific times should be planned and adhered to.
 - 2.3.1.4.2. SET exercises may be delayed pending real-world activities and continued as deemed necessary.
 - 2.3.1.5. Give detailed instructions on the action to take.
 - 2.3.1.5.1. Perpetrators must obey instructions.
 - 2.3.1.5.2. Perpetrators may not commit seemingly hostile acts.
 - 2.3.1.5.3. Perpetrators will not use physical violence.
 - 2.3.1.6. Safety of personnel will be in the forefront of everyone's mind and stringently enforced at all times. Again, these exercises will be immediately terminated if a potentially dangerous situation exists. At no time will perpetrators carry actual weapons.
- 2.4. The grading scale for all SET exercises will be "mission ready - GREEN," "ready with comments that require action or attention - LIGHT GREEN," or "not mission ready - RED."
- 2.5. The advertisement "EXERCISE" will precede and follow the initial exercise communication for radio/telephone transmissions and will be used frequently throughout the exercise.
- 2.6. After all exercises, the Installation Security Constable will conduct a critique to give positive feedback on lessons learned. If a unit or work center fails a SET exercise, a re-evaluation with similar

circumstances must be conducted after 30 days, but no longer than 60 days from the date of the failure.

2.7. A memorandum will be sent to the unit commander of the failure and forwarded back to the Installation Security Constable. The memorandum will contain the exercise scenario, actions during exercise, what should have happened during the exercise, and follow-up actions.

3. Security Protection Levels.

3.1. Protection Level 1: Highest priority. Applies to weapons systems on alert status for direct enemy engagement, all nuclear weapons in the United States Air Force arsenal, and components of tactical command/control/warning facilities (example: none assigned to MacDill AFB).

3.2. Protection Level 2: Second highest priority. Applies to the major components of weapons systems that are not on alert status but are on bases and sites from which they could be launched for direct strikes against or engagement with the enemy (example: AWACS/KC-135 on alert).

3.3. Protection Level 3: Third highest priority. Applies to combat aircraft and missiles that cannot be considered in place by virtue of their present location. It also applies to logistics, air commando, reconnaissance, and the like aircraft designated for direct support of engaged combat forces or required to sustain operations in general limited war (example: KC-135).

3.4. Protection Level 4: Lowest priority. Controlled areas: Areas not meeting the above criteria but requiring additional security measures (example: Security Forces Control Center).

4. Security Terms and Definitions.

4.1. Restricted Area: A legally established military zone under United States Air Force jurisdiction into which persons may not enter without specific authorization. This authorization comes from the Installation Commander (in accordance with AFI 31-101). Restricted areas contain operational resources such as the Command Post or Protection Level 1, 2, or 3 aircraft. The use of deadly force in these areas is authorized by Security Forces personnel (in accordance with AFI 31-207, *Arming and Use of Force by USAF Personnel*).

4.1.1. Restricted area boundaries are identified by raised barriers or a 4-6 inch red stripe painted on the concrete and restricted area signs posted every 100 feet. If a building or room is a restricted area, all doors will be marked with restricted area signs.

4.1.2. Personnel may only enter restricted areas via established entry control points that are marked by a 4-6 inch white stripe painted onto the concrete and signs denoting that area as a valid entry control point.

4.2. HELPING HAND. Term used to report an unusual incident, possibly hostile, that affects a protection level resource. Examples include an incident where an individual enters the restricted area somewhere other than an established entry control point, or discovering an individual inside the restricted area without a restricted area badge and not under proper escort.

4.3. COVERED WAGON. Initially, this is an unclassified telephonic report sent up the chain of command. It shows that a condition exists, or an event has occurred at a base in connection with protection level resources as the result of actual or probable hostile actions. A Covered Wagon report could result from an upgrading of a HELPING HAND based on investigation of the Security Response Team. It can also result if an event is serious enough to immediately suspect enemy action. Examples include

an unauthorized individual tampering with an aircraft or an individual on the flight line with the intent of causing some type of harm to a protection level resource.

5. Restricted Area Badge.

5.1. The AF Form 1199B and 1199CD, **USAF Restricted Area Badge (RAB)**, serves as an official document issued to a person who has been granted unescorted entry authority into a restricted area assigned to MacDill AFB. The AF Form 1199CD is currently replacing the 1199B through attrition.

5.2. There are currently four number designations open on MacDill AFB RAB.

5.2.1. Area #1: 6 AMW Command Post. (The Command Post maintains the same priority as the highest permanently assigned protection level resource on the installation.)

5.2.2. Area #2: 6 AMW Command Post Battle Staff.

5.2.3. Area #4: Mass Parking Area/Aircraft Maintenance Hangars. The 6 AMW mass aircraft parking area is designated a Protection Level 3 restricted area (when aircraft are present) and will encompass the north ramp, to include the wash racks, extending along the northwest boundary of the ramp. The restricted area will extend to fuel pit 17 and continue east encompassing fuel pits 16-25. Number 4 open on the RAB is an Air Mobility Command (AMC) wide designator. This means if you are temporary duty (TDY) to another AMC base or someone is here TDY from an AMC base, unescorted entry authority is granted into AMC ramp for official use in conjunction with official military orders if supported by a copy of crew orders or individual TDY orders. These orders will be authenticated by local Security Forces.

5.2.4. Area #9: Earth Satellite Terminal.

5.3. Wear of the RAB: The restricted area badge will be worn above the waist of your outermost garment and be in plain view when inside a restricted area. The restricted area badge will be secured to the wearer by means of parachute cord or similar device. The wear of the armband is authorized and must be stowed away once you exit the restricted area.

5.3.1. Ensure the RAB is removed and secured from view upon departing the restricted area or within close proximity of an aircraft during engine run.

5.3.2. If the bearer is asked to surrender their badge for inspection by a flight line worker with a valid RAB or a Security Forces member, they will do so immediately.

5.3.3. It is the bearer's responsibility to ensure that not only themselves, but others around them are properly displaying their RABs.

5.3.4. If a RAB is lost, stolen, mutilated, or does not match the information on the bearer's DD Form 2, **Geneva Conventions Identification Card**, the bearer must contact their unit security manager immediately to accomplish the proper actions.

5.3.4.1. The bearer must account for their RAB at all times.

5.3.4.2. The bearer may not rely on another individual to escort them into or around the restricted area if they are not in possession of their RAB. Escorting procedures are set up for personnel who may have a limited access to the areas, not personnel who fail to secure their RAB.

5.3.4.3. For restricted areas containing Protection Level 3 resources, any person possessing a

valid AF Form 1199B or 1199CD for that area may perform duties as an escort official for that area. No designation of this authority is required on the AF Form 2586, **Unescorted Entry Authorization Certificate**, or AF Form 1199. However, areas that are upgraded to a higher priority during contingencies, or aircraft in Protection Level 2 alert status, will have select personnel designated as escort officials via an Entry Authorization List (EAL). For Protection Level 1 and 2 areas, individuals will be identified by an "E" on the EAL next to the areas in which they are authorized to act as escort officials.

5.3.5. Visitor escort. All individuals issued unescorted entry authority to Area 4 are authorized to escort individuals into the restricted area. The person providing the escort and escorted individual must be within sight at all times. The individual escorting is accountable for the escorted individual's actions while they are in the restricted area.

5.3.5.1. All photography in or around restricted areas or Protection Level resources within the legal confines of MacDill AFB is prohibited unless coordinated as outlined below. Owner/user and Security Forces will stay alert to identify any unofficial photography, filming, or audio recordings.

5.3.5.2. Official Public Affairs Tours:

5.3.5.2.1. Public Affairs (6 AMW/PA) will coordinate the dates and locations of all official base tours with the below listed agencies to ensure no classified actions are in progress:

5.3.5.2.1.1. Agency to be photographed

5.3.5.2.1.2. Security Forces Operations (6 SFS/SFO)

5.3.5.2.1.3. Airfield Management (6 OSS/OSAA)

5.3.5.2.1.4. Command Post (6 AMW/CP)

5.3.5.2.2. News media personnel photographing on MacDill AFB must be escorted by Public Affairs personnel at all times.

5.3.5.2.3. Public Affairs personnel are responsible for the control of all personnel on the tour.

5.3.5.3. Non-Public Affairs Tours:

5.3.5.3.1. Personnel wanting to take photographs when not on an official Public Affairs tour must coordinate all requests through Base Operations.

5.3.5.3.2. Base Operations will coordinate the dates and locations of all photographic activities with the below listed agencies to ensure no classified actions are in progress:

5.3.5.3.2.1. Agency to be photographed

5.3.5.3.2.2. Security Forces Operations (6 SFS/SFO)

5.3.5.3.2.3. Airfield Management (6 OSS/OSAA)

5.3.5.3.2.4. Command Post (6 AMW/CP)

5.3.5.4. Once clearance has been coordinated, Base Operations will issue the requester a locally produced "photo pass" and brief the individual on authorized areas to photograph and

flight line security procedures.

6. Helping Hand/Covered Wagon Reporting Procedures.

6.1. Alertness: All personnel inside the restricted area must know who and what is going on around them at all times. Everyone must look for unauthorized personnel.

6.1.1. As an individual is approached in a restricted area, their badge must be displayed in accordance with paragraph 4.3.

6.1.2. If the individual has a badge, but is not recognized as a co-worker, they should be checked further by asking questions about the badge, why they are in the area, where they work, and may even be asked for other credentials to verify the information on their AF Form 1199B/1199CD.

6.2. Detection: All personnel inside the restricted area must look for abnormal conditions on or around equipment they work with, such as cut wires, fuel leakage, missing batteries, and boxes or containers unattended around surrounding equipment. Individuals entering through unauthorized entry points to a restricted area could very well be attempting to cause serious damage to valuable resources.

6.3. Sound the Alarm:

6.3.1. HELPING HAND: In an unclassified message, SFCC reports to the installation command post of an unusual incident, possibly hostile, that affects a Protection Level resource.

6.3.2. COVERED WAGON: In an unclassified message, SFCC reports to the installation command post of an unusual incident, probable or actually hostile, that affects a Protection Level resource.

6.3.3. Manual HELPING HAND/COVERED WAGON Reporting Signals:

6.3.3.1. Daylight Hours: Personnel will wave their headgear or hand over their head in a circular motion and shout, "HELPING HAND" or "COVERED WAGON," as applicable.

6.3.3.2. Hours of darkness: Personnel will wave a flashlight in a circular motion and shout, "HELPING HAND" or "COVERED WAGON," as applicable.

6.3.4. If any individuals hear a HELPING HAND alarm, they should temporarily drop what they are doing, safety permitting, and assist.

6.3.5. One individual should then run to the nearest telephone or radio equipped vehicle and report the incident and location to the Security Forces Control Center (SFCC, 828-3322/23/24).

6.3.6. If a security response team is in the area and readily available, they should be requested for assistance.

6.4. Detain and keep the suspect at a disadvantage: Use voice commands to halt the suspect(s) and keep them in place.

6.4.1. Keep their hands above their head and feet spread to ensure the safety of yourself, others, and the resource.

6.4.2. DO NOT get involved in a physical confrontation with a suspect. If the suspect(s) fails to heed a challenge or departs the vicinity, keep them under observation until they can no longer be seen.

6.4.3. Relay all pertinent information to SFCC or responding patrols.

7. Force Protection Conditions.

7.1. Force Protection Conditions (FPCON) are implemented when a threat, based on current intelligence or circumstances, indicates that a period of increased threat exists toward base resources, facilities, or personnel.

7.2. Any threat condition may be implemented at any time by the Installation Commander.

7.3. Terrorist Force Protection Conditions are separated into the following categories:

7.3.1. FPCON Normal: Normal Security Operations.

7.3.2. FPCON Alpha: Declared as a general warning of possible terrorist activity, of which the nature and extent are unpredictable.

7.3.3. FPCON Bravo: Declared when there is an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no particular target has been identified.

7.3.4. FPCON Charlie: Declared when an incident occurs or when intelligence indicates that some form of terrorist action is imminent.

7.3.5. FPCON Delta: Declared in the immediate area where a terrorist act has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location is likely.

8. Tricks That Might Be Used To Gain Unauthorized Entry Into A Restricted Area.

8.1. One method to gain unauthorized entry is simply walking into the restricted area, hoping no one will bother to question the need to be in the area.

8.2. Another method is the use of a bogus restricted area badge. Examples are homemade badges, and lost or stolen badges that have been altered.

8.3. After being stopped without a restricted area badge, unauthorized personnel may state they have lost their badge or simply forgot it. If this happens, detain the individual and have a Security Forces member respond to verify their explanation.

9. Summary.

9.1. What factor will enable our installation to oppose an unfolding widespread enemy clandestine operation with maximum possible preparedness? In one word-SPEED; speed in which required reports are initiated; speed in which such reports are flashed to and analyzed by higher headquarters. Remember, any circumstances delaying the receipt of HELPING HAND and COVERED WAGON reports will lessen the possibility of timely reaction to the opening phase of a widespread coordinated enemy attack.

9.2. Your physical and mental capabilities will be tasked to the utmost if no other personnel are available to assist you. The obligation of detaining an unauthorized person and promptly reporting the incident may well be beyond your capability. In such instances, you must evaluate comparative physical superiority of the suspect, weapons in the suspect's possession, and the extent of damage that could be inflicted upon our sensitive resources. These considerations must be compared against the time it will take you to report the incident to the SFCC and receive assistance from the Security Forces. If at all

possible, accomplish these tasks simultaneously. If they are obviously beyond your capability, report the incident to the SFCC as rapidly as possible. In reporting the incident by telephone or radio, speak in a clear voice and remain calm. Be sure to include details (who, what, when, where, and how) of the incident in your report. These two factors are required for Security Forces dispatching the help you need.

9.3. Return to the area where the suspect(s) was last seen. Attempt to relocate the suspect(s) and keep them under observation. Watch for and attract the attention of the responding Security Forces so they will arrive at the earliest possible moment. Meet the patrol and immediately report the incident again and any other pertinent information you have to the Security Force patrol. Explain what happened. The information you give the security response team is the basis for the necessary counter-actions.

9.4. Our combat capability can be placed in unnecessary jeopardy if we fail to carry out our individual security responsibilities by detecting and reporting hostile or possible hostile events and detaining unauthorized persons. If these actions are not within your capability, keep the intruders under surveillance. You must recognize that enemy clandestine activity against our installation or any others could mean that an enemy attack against the nation has begun.

9.5. Security responsibility is placed squarely on all personnel. An alert command of dedicated personnel, reinforced with specialized aerospace Security Forces, is the most dangerous situation into which enemy agents can enter. You are contributing to our national survival by guaranteeing the ground protection of our general war resources.

9.6. Security of our protection level resources is not only the responsibility of the Security Forces, it is everyone's responsibility--you are the eyes and ears of MacDill AFB.

WILLIAM W. HODGES, Maj Gen (Sel), USAF
Commander

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

AFPD 31-1, *Physical Security*

AFI 31-101, *The Installation Security Program*

AFI 31-207, *Arming and Use of Force by USAF Personnel*

MacDill AFB Installation Security Plan 31-101